[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
community to provide further support to bolster the regimes of weak
states. International aid has certainly kept many weak states afloat that
would have otherwise ceased functioning entirely. Indeed, in several
cases the withdrawal of international aid has led to the collapse of
failed states (Zartman 1995). Still, the international community has
had few successes in which the structures of weak states have been
permanently strengthened. Development aid has not historically pro-
duced strong states. More commonly, additional aid has served to en-
rich corrupt leaders and help them maintain power, rather than pro-
duce healthy economies and robust political institutions. To remedy
this, development organizations now focus on a broader array of goals,
including institution building and rule of law. Yet the recipe for
creating strong, stable states remains elusive. In the future, the interna-
tional development regime may devise strategies that effectively yield
strong economic and political structures. At present, however, develop-
ment aid is not likely to rid the world of lengthy civil wars.
Another commonly mentioned solution to intractable civil war is
secession (Kaufmann 1996; Sambanis 2002). Since opposition coali-
tions frequently claim that national independence is their goal, perhaps
allowing self-government would provide a lasting resolution to the
conflict. The international community has historically opposed seces-
sion, and hence secession attempts have usually failed. The world pol-
ity typically refuses to recognize secessionist regions, even in cases
where insurgents have achieved de facto control over a contiguous terri-
tory. Without external recognition and the aid that comes with it, se-
cessionist regions eventually collapse and are re-integrated, which, in-
cidentally, demonstrates the critical importance of the international
community in sustaining weak states.
In recent years the international community has shifted in the direc-
154 Neverending Wars
tion of recognizing and protecting secessionist regions. The world s
recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia as sovereign
states was historically unusual. The UN has also taken a strong stance
in protecting the secessionist regions of Kosovo and the Kurds of Iraq.
Other sub-national groups, such as the indigenous peoples of Latin
America, have also begun to gain status as international actors (Brysk
2000; Van Cott 2000). This historical shift towards international rec-
ognition of secessionist regions may alter the international ecology of
states allowing fragmented or disorganized states to be reconfigured
so as to be more feasibly governable. Over time, this may result in
more stable states and a decrease in the length of civil wars, particularly
if secession were routinely to be seen as a legitimate option.
Although secession may alter the institutional ecology of states and
eventually reduce the likelihood of new intractable wars, I am less opti-
mistic that it will necessarily resolve wars that are already in progress.
The notion that warring parties can be split is quite a simplification.
Insurgents in weak state wars band in coalitions of many groups, often
with quite different aims. Some may be satisfied by secession, but oth-
ers may not. Moreover, opposition groups that have gained sovereignty
often collapse into civil war among themselves. Dividing a state rav-
aged by war may simply result in two states that are even weaker, with
smaller economies, fewer resources, and greater dependency on for-
eign aid.
A third option would be greater international attention and pressure
for the reduction of low-level intervention. Historically, the interna-
tional community has paid little attention to low-intensity interven-
tions the provision of resources, military equipment, and covert assis-
tance that are so widespread today. Whereas decisive intervention has
been proscribed, flows of military aid and covert assistance have be-
come routine, with devastating consequences for weak-state civil wars.
Civil wars often cease or greatly diminish in intensity with the with-
drawal of these interstate involvements, yet there is currently little
awareness of the devastating effects of such low-level interventions,
which allow wars to drag on for years and generate massive casualties.
International mobilization against low-level intervention might sub-
stantially reduce the length and bloodiness of civil wars. For instance,
the international social movement against the use of land mines, spear-
headed by Princess Diana, has led to international treaties banning the
The Logic of Twentieth-Century Civil Wars 155
use of these destructive weapons. Greater international monitoring
and attention to the milder forms of interstate participation might lead
to a similar reduction in low-intensity forms of such intervention, re-
sulting in the slowing or dissipating of weak-state civil wars.
An even more promising possibility would be the return of decisive
external interventions. Traditionally, international law has regarded
civil wars as purely a matter for sovereign states, over which the inter-
national community had no jurisdiction (Brownlie 1963). This ten-
dency was reinforced during the Cold War, when international bodies
such as the United Nations were careful to give the appearance of neu-
trality for fear of endorsing either the Western or communist model of
the state. This wariness resulted in peacekeeping missions that explic-
itly did not try to terminate civil wars.
Since the end of the Cold War, however, the world polity has showed
increasing willingness to intervene decisively in the civil conflicts and
governance of other sovereign nations. The recent interventions in the
civil wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, for example, were remi-
niscent of the nineteenth century, when the European Great Powers
would jointly agree on the affairs of other countries and decisively in-
tervene to make it so. If the international community would routinely
insist on the termination of civil wars in weak states, and back up its in-
sistence with both words and actions, this would prove a powerful im-
petus for the ending of civil wars.
Consideration of the international dimension is essential for both ac-
ademics and policymakers fully to understand the dynamics of contem- [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl fopke.keep.pl
community to provide further support to bolster the regimes of weak
states. International aid has certainly kept many weak states afloat that
would have otherwise ceased functioning entirely. Indeed, in several
cases the withdrawal of international aid has led to the collapse of
failed states (Zartman 1995). Still, the international community has
had few successes in which the structures of weak states have been
permanently strengthened. Development aid has not historically pro-
duced strong states. More commonly, additional aid has served to en-
rich corrupt leaders and help them maintain power, rather than pro-
duce healthy economies and robust political institutions. To remedy
this, development organizations now focus on a broader array of goals,
including institution building and rule of law. Yet the recipe for
creating strong, stable states remains elusive. In the future, the interna-
tional development regime may devise strategies that effectively yield
strong economic and political structures. At present, however, develop-
ment aid is not likely to rid the world of lengthy civil wars.
Another commonly mentioned solution to intractable civil war is
secession (Kaufmann 1996; Sambanis 2002). Since opposition coali-
tions frequently claim that national independence is their goal, perhaps
allowing self-government would provide a lasting resolution to the
conflict. The international community has historically opposed seces-
sion, and hence secession attempts have usually failed. The world pol-
ity typically refuses to recognize secessionist regions, even in cases
where insurgents have achieved de facto control over a contiguous terri-
tory. Without external recognition and the aid that comes with it, se-
cessionist regions eventually collapse and are re-integrated, which, in-
cidentally, demonstrates the critical importance of the international
community in sustaining weak states.
In recent years the international community has shifted in the direc-
154 Neverending Wars
tion of recognizing and protecting secessionist regions. The world s
recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia as sovereign
states was historically unusual. The UN has also taken a strong stance
in protecting the secessionist regions of Kosovo and the Kurds of Iraq.
Other sub-national groups, such as the indigenous peoples of Latin
America, have also begun to gain status as international actors (Brysk
2000; Van Cott 2000). This historical shift towards international rec-
ognition of secessionist regions may alter the international ecology of
states allowing fragmented or disorganized states to be reconfigured
so as to be more feasibly governable. Over time, this may result in
more stable states and a decrease in the length of civil wars, particularly
if secession were routinely to be seen as a legitimate option.
Although secession may alter the institutional ecology of states and
eventually reduce the likelihood of new intractable wars, I am less opti-
mistic that it will necessarily resolve wars that are already in progress.
The notion that warring parties can be split is quite a simplification.
Insurgents in weak state wars band in coalitions of many groups, often
with quite different aims. Some may be satisfied by secession, but oth-
ers may not. Moreover, opposition groups that have gained sovereignty
often collapse into civil war among themselves. Dividing a state rav-
aged by war may simply result in two states that are even weaker, with
smaller economies, fewer resources, and greater dependency on for-
eign aid.
A third option would be greater international attention and pressure
for the reduction of low-level intervention. Historically, the interna-
tional community has paid little attention to low-intensity interven-
tions the provision of resources, military equipment, and covert assis-
tance that are so widespread today. Whereas decisive intervention has
been proscribed, flows of military aid and covert assistance have be-
come routine, with devastating consequences for weak-state civil wars.
Civil wars often cease or greatly diminish in intensity with the with-
drawal of these interstate involvements, yet there is currently little
awareness of the devastating effects of such low-level interventions,
which allow wars to drag on for years and generate massive casualties.
International mobilization against low-level intervention might sub-
stantially reduce the length and bloodiness of civil wars. For instance,
the international social movement against the use of land mines, spear-
headed by Princess Diana, has led to international treaties banning the
The Logic of Twentieth-Century Civil Wars 155
use of these destructive weapons. Greater international monitoring
and attention to the milder forms of interstate participation might lead
to a similar reduction in low-intensity forms of such intervention, re-
sulting in the slowing or dissipating of weak-state civil wars.
An even more promising possibility would be the return of decisive
external interventions. Traditionally, international law has regarded
civil wars as purely a matter for sovereign states, over which the inter-
national community had no jurisdiction (Brownlie 1963). This ten-
dency was reinforced during the Cold War, when international bodies
such as the United Nations were careful to give the appearance of neu-
trality for fear of endorsing either the Western or communist model of
the state. This wariness resulted in peacekeeping missions that explic-
itly did not try to terminate civil wars.
Since the end of the Cold War, however, the world polity has showed
increasing willingness to intervene decisively in the civil conflicts and
governance of other sovereign nations. The recent interventions in the
civil wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, for example, were remi-
niscent of the nineteenth century, when the European Great Powers
would jointly agree on the affairs of other countries and decisively in-
tervene to make it so. If the international community would routinely
insist on the termination of civil wars in weak states, and back up its in-
sistence with both words and actions, this would prove a powerful im-
petus for the ending of civil wars.
Consideration of the international dimension is essential for both ac-
ademics and policymakers fully to understand the dynamics of contem- [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]