[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
just any set of values. In addition, the principle of public reason is also
stronger than Audi s principle of secular rationale, which requires us to
appeal only to non-religious reasons (Audi 2000: 86 96), because the prin-
ciple of public reason requires us to appeal only to the set of values within
the public conception of justice, and so it does not allow us to appeal to
values that are otherwise secular, like personal autonomy, if they are not
among the values in the political conception. However, public reason does
not require us to accept Audi s principle of secular motivation, which
requires that the person herself be motivated by adequate secular reasons
134 Trust and practices of public reason
(Audi 2000: 96 100). The demands of civility only require us to offer
reasons that are in fact sufficient to justify the public action, whether they
constitute a central part of our own motivations or not. Of course, Audi is
right that if we offer reasons that we think are false, then we undermine
our own credibility, and we may thereby undermine trust indirectly as
well. But since we offer reasons that are adequate within the public con-
ception of justice, we do not violate public reason when we do so.
The second duty that civility imposes on us is that it requires us not
only to respect others by offering reasons that we can expect them to
accept, but also to respect them by listening to the reasons they give with
great care and sympathy. We should endeavor to see the other s position in
the best possible light. Indeed, we should interpret their points as an argu-
ment about public reason if we can do so even if they are explicitly not
presented to us as such. To do so may require us to understand the argu-
ments of others on their own terms.7 We have an obligation to try to
understand our adversaries as they understand themselves and then inter-
pret their views so that they are compatible with the requirement of public
reason. We cannot simply dismiss their arguments because they are not
formulated as we would wish. Only when we listen with such empathy
and understanding can we then try to formulate a policy that can address
the legitimate concerns expressed by all sides.
In the debate over homosexual marriages, the duty of civility requires
both sides to defend their views in terms of the public conception of
justice. The claims of the empirical arguments against homosexual mar-
riages (pages 122 5) fit this form: they are claims about what harms could
come to society if homosexual marriages are allowed, about how such
marriages would damage other forms of marriage, or about why children
would be hurt if they were exposed to such families. These harms, if they
existed, would be recognizable as harms by those who seek to expand the
definition of marriage. The claims of the moral argument, on the other
hand, fail to meet this test: the harms there defined make sense only within
a traditionalists view of marriage as the God-given basis for society. To
reconstruct this argument within public reason, I think, turns it into a
version of the claims that homosexual marriages will undermine the
stability of families. If so, the debate about homosexual marriage turns
completely on the strength of the first kinds of arguments against it. On
this point, traditionalists and rights activists will disagree about whether in
fact a recognizable harm will occur. Nevertheless, when we separate the
claims about the harms caused by such marriages into those that are recog-
nizable to others and those that are not, then the case against homosexual
marriage is, I think, quite weak.
On the other hand, the claims of homosexuals do not bear as heavy a
burden in this case. They ask merely to participate in a privilege offered to
others already. To exclude them from the privilege of marriage implies a
discrimination against them that must then be justified. In other cases,
Trust and practices of public reason 135
such justifications are often at hand: we do not, for example, extend the
privilege of free religion to, say, Satanists who actually wish to sacrifice
infants because of the harm they would cause to those infants. But the
burden is on the opponents to show that some recognizable harm would
occur if the privileges of marriage were extended to gays and lesbians.
Homosexuals are not, then, asking for special rights, only the rights
offered to other people who are similarly situated (Marcosson 1995). So
the traditionalists must show as I believe they cannot that some harm
recognized within the public conception of reason is likely to occur if
homosexuals marry, so that the status of homosexuals is significantly dif-
ferent from that of others.
For these reasons, the practices of public reason have even more
significance than Rawls realizes. Rawls understands that these practices are
crucial for creating a playing field on which different sides of many differ-
ent disputes can meet and try to find a common answer to the problems
they see. But having a common set of rules for that public space is also
crucial to the goal of building trust between groups with different compre-
hensive doctrines. The rules of public reason, however, are substantive and
not just procedural: basic rights cannot be challenged without undermin-
ing the basic security that members of the society feel and without under-
mining their trust in the society as a whole. The use of state power must be
grounded in powers that everyone could in principle accept as legitimate
even if they disagree about its particular use in some cases.
The burdens of public reason
The key, then, to the practice of trust-building in contemporary society is
the practice of public reason. Nevertheless, such a practice is highly con-
troversial. Criticisms fall, I think, into two broad categories: first, the
worry is that the practice unfairly burdens practitioners of some compre-
hensive doctrines, particularly religious doctrines; and second, the claim is
that the actual substance of the requirements cannot support a robust
practice of politics. I discuss the first, and more common objection here,
reserving the second for the following section (pages 140 4).
The first criticism is that requiring traditionalists to use arguments that
could in principle convince their opponents places an unfair burden on
them, and it alienates them from political participation by preventing them
from presenting the considerations they feel are most important. Instead of
creating trust, the public conception of justice, in effect, expels many
members of society from the political arena (Neuhaus 1984; Carter 1993;
Wolterstorff 1997). As Nicholas Wolterstorff puts the point,
A significant part of how some citizens exercise their religion is that
their decisions and debates on political issues are in good measure
based on their religious convictions. Using their religious convictions
136 Trust and practices of public reason [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl fopke.keep.pl
just any set of values. In addition, the principle of public reason is also
stronger than Audi s principle of secular rationale, which requires us to
appeal only to non-religious reasons (Audi 2000: 86 96), because the prin-
ciple of public reason requires us to appeal only to the set of values within
the public conception of justice, and so it does not allow us to appeal to
values that are otherwise secular, like personal autonomy, if they are not
among the values in the political conception. However, public reason does
not require us to accept Audi s principle of secular motivation, which
requires that the person herself be motivated by adequate secular reasons
134 Trust and practices of public reason
(Audi 2000: 96 100). The demands of civility only require us to offer
reasons that are in fact sufficient to justify the public action, whether they
constitute a central part of our own motivations or not. Of course, Audi is
right that if we offer reasons that we think are false, then we undermine
our own credibility, and we may thereby undermine trust indirectly as
well. But since we offer reasons that are adequate within the public con-
ception of justice, we do not violate public reason when we do so.
The second duty that civility imposes on us is that it requires us not
only to respect others by offering reasons that we can expect them to
accept, but also to respect them by listening to the reasons they give with
great care and sympathy. We should endeavor to see the other s position in
the best possible light. Indeed, we should interpret their points as an argu-
ment about public reason if we can do so even if they are explicitly not
presented to us as such. To do so may require us to understand the argu-
ments of others on their own terms.7 We have an obligation to try to
understand our adversaries as they understand themselves and then inter-
pret their views so that they are compatible with the requirement of public
reason. We cannot simply dismiss their arguments because they are not
formulated as we would wish. Only when we listen with such empathy
and understanding can we then try to formulate a policy that can address
the legitimate concerns expressed by all sides.
In the debate over homosexual marriages, the duty of civility requires
both sides to defend their views in terms of the public conception of
justice. The claims of the empirical arguments against homosexual mar-
riages (pages 122 5) fit this form: they are claims about what harms could
come to society if homosexual marriages are allowed, about how such
marriages would damage other forms of marriage, or about why children
would be hurt if they were exposed to such families. These harms, if they
existed, would be recognizable as harms by those who seek to expand the
definition of marriage. The claims of the moral argument, on the other
hand, fail to meet this test: the harms there defined make sense only within
a traditionalists view of marriage as the God-given basis for society. To
reconstruct this argument within public reason, I think, turns it into a
version of the claims that homosexual marriages will undermine the
stability of families. If so, the debate about homosexual marriage turns
completely on the strength of the first kinds of arguments against it. On
this point, traditionalists and rights activists will disagree about whether in
fact a recognizable harm will occur. Nevertheless, when we separate the
claims about the harms caused by such marriages into those that are recog-
nizable to others and those that are not, then the case against homosexual
marriage is, I think, quite weak.
On the other hand, the claims of homosexuals do not bear as heavy a
burden in this case. They ask merely to participate in a privilege offered to
others already. To exclude them from the privilege of marriage implies a
discrimination against them that must then be justified. In other cases,
Trust and practices of public reason 135
such justifications are often at hand: we do not, for example, extend the
privilege of free religion to, say, Satanists who actually wish to sacrifice
infants because of the harm they would cause to those infants. But the
burden is on the opponents to show that some recognizable harm would
occur if the privileges of marriage were extended to gays and lesbians.
Homosexuals are not, then, asking for special rights, only the rights
offered to other people who are similarly situated (Marcosson 1995). So
the traditionalists must show as I believe they cannot that some harm
recognized within the public conception of reason is likely to occur if
homosexuals marry, so that the status of homosexuals is significantly dif-
ferent from that of others.
For these reasons, the practices of public reason have even more
significance than Rawls realizes. Rawls understands that these practices are
crucial for creating a playing field on which different sides of many differ-
ent disputes can meet and try to find a common answer to the problems
they see. But having a common set of rules for that public space is also
crucial to the goal of building trust between groups with different compre-
hensive doctrines. The rules of public reason, however, are substantive and
not just procedural: basic rights cannot be challenged without undermin-
ing the basic security that members of the society feel and without under-
mining their trust in the society as a whole. The use of state power must be
grounded in powers that everyone could in principle accept as legitimate
even if they disagree about its particular use in some cases.
The burdens of public reason
The key, then, to the practice of trust-building in contemporary society is
the practice of public reason. Nevertheless, such a practice is highly con-
troversial. Criticisms fall, I think, into two broad categories: first, the
worry is that the practice unfairly burdens practitioners of some compre-
hensive doctrines, particularly religious doctrines; and second, the claim is
that the actual substance of the requirements cannot support a robust
practice of politics. I discuss the first, and more common objection here,
reserving the second for the following section (pages 140 4).
The first criticism is that requiring traditionalists to use arguments that
could in principle convince their opponents places an unfair burden on
them, and it alienates them from political participation by preventing them
from presenting the considerations they feel are most important. Instead of
creating trust, the public conception of justice, in effect, expels many
members of society from the political arena (Neuhaus 1984; Carter 1993;
Wolterstorff 1997). As Nicholas Wolterstorff puts the point,
A significant part of how some citizens exercise their religion is that
their decisions and debates on political issues are in good measure
based on their religious convictions. Using their religious convictions
136 Trust and practices of public reason [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]