[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
breaking of the New York Times [Pentagon Papers] story." This promising project, however, was jettisoned
when Tex McCrary, who was to be the fund-raiser for the foundation, inadvertently told a journalist about the
plan to raise money from the drug to wage the heroin crusade. As Donfeld pointed out in a February 4, 1972,
memorandum, "Once it becomes known that we are courting the pharmaceutical industry, the integrity of the
project is impugned," and he recommended that "someone turn off McCrary." Even though by this time Gen.
William Westmoreland and Tricia Nixon had been mobilized for the March of Dollars, Haldeman decided
reluctantly to "turn off" the foundation idea.
As it turned out, narcotics did not prove to be as great a lure for attracting celebrities and finances as the Nixon
strategists had hoped.
As the 1972 election approached, and corporations contributed, illicitly, tens of millions of dollars to the
Nixon reelection campaign, and celebrities joined the political bandwagon, the "celebrity file" was closed.
http://www.mega.nu:8080/ampp/epstein/aof18.html (3 of 3) [9/16/2000 16:16:27]
World War III
Agency of Fear
Opiates and Political Power in America
By Edward Jay Epstein
Chapter 19 - World War III
On August 2, 1971, Nelson Gross, of Saddle River, New Jersey, was chosen to lead a worldwide attack on
illicit drugs. As A New Jersey politician, Gross had been successful in staging a quiet revolt against the older
wing of the Republican party in New Jersey, thus gaining a modicum of power for himself in 1968. He failed
to win elected office as a congressman or senator, even though he ran loyally on President Nixon's
law-and-order theme. After his defeat for the Senate in 1970, Gross asked Nixon for a position in foreign
policy, and Nixon appointed him senior advisor and coordinator for international narcotics matters at the
Department of State. In theory, the "global war against drugs was to be coordinated by the newly created
(September, 1971) Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, which held its first meeting on
network television and included such illustrious figures as Secretary of State William Rogers, who nominally
chaired the new committee, Attorney General John Mitchell, Secretary of the Treasury John Connally,
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, newly appointed Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, and CIA director
Richard Helms. The committee met on only three other occasions before it was phased out after the 1972
election, and most of the day-to-day tactical decisions were left to Gross and Egil Krogh, who was, in addition
to his other duties, executive director of the cabinet committee.
Although a battle had temporarily been won in Turkey, the war against heroin was anything but over-at least
as far as Gross and Krogh were concerned. The 1972 election was little more than a year away, and there was
the dramatic possibility for further victories in the war against heroin. The rapidly expanding BNDD (its
budget had trebled in four years) advanced the theory that there still remained a large Turkish stockpile of
opium, which would explain the need for drug agents in the foreseeable future. According to the convenient
stockpile theory, every Turkish poppy farmer had squirreled away a hoard of opium as a dowry for his
daughter's marriage and for other future emergencies. Even though they were now being forced by their
government to plow under their opium crops, they could reach into this presumed hoard and sell it to
traffickers for the American market.
President Nixon had already publicly demanded the eradication of the poppy flower from the entire world, and
Gross concluded that America could not wait for the screw worm to be developed. The Golden Triangle was
not only producing ten times as much illicit opium as Turkey ever produced but supplying about 20 percent of
the American soldiers in Vietnam with pure heroin. Gross foresaw that it was only a matter of time before this
Golden Triangle heroin found its way into the American market, and he decided to consult Graham Martin,
who had been ambassador to Thailand and to Italy before becoming ambassador to South Vietnam. Much to
Gross's surprise, but not necessarily to the White House staffs, Ambassador Martin, in a state of exasperation,
reported in no uncertain terms that the only way of disrupting the supply of opium from the Golden Triangle
was to organize assassination teams to kill the few key traffickers that controlled the trade. Though New Jersey
politics in Gross's day were fairly tough, assassinations seemed extreme.
http://www.mega.nu:8080/ampp/epstein/aof19.html (1 of 3) [9/16/2000 16:16:51]
World War III
Instead, Gross decided to -make heroin a primary foreign-policy objective of the United States. He ordered
fifty-odd American embassies around the world to draw tip fiction plans which specified how American
diplomats in those countries could stimulate interest in the heroin problem to persuade the host government to
conform to American narcotics objectives, and to detail ways in which the CIA and State Department
intelligence could be used to discover and intercept heroin traffic. Gross further wanted American diplomats to
threaten any country that refused to cooperate in the effort with an immediate cutoff of economic and military
aid. He even suggested the use of the American veto to prevent the World Bank and other international
financial organizations from extending credit to such countries. There was considerable concern in the higher
councils of the State Department that such "heroin diplomacy," as Gross called it, would lose more friends for
the United States than it would net traffickers, and might endanger what they considered more long-term
foreign-policy objectives, such as the safety of the United States. Henry Kissinger's National Security Council
also had its doubts about heroin diplomacy, especially since less than two months before Gross assumed his
command in the new global war, the secret report of a White House task force with representatives from both
the National Security Council and the State Department concluded, "application of aid sanctions would be
ineffective and counterproductive except where degrees of U.S. support establish overwhelming diplomatic
dependence (Vietnam)." The White House task force recognized that aid sanctions might result in favorable
publicity for the president, but listed against this advantage six drawbacks.
1. would exasperate relations and make cooperation even less likely.
2. may create internal political repercussions making it difficult for governments to cooperate (Turkey,
Pakistan, India).
3. Would be counterproductive to other major U.S. security and foreign policy needs (Southeast Asia, Turkey).
4. Cannot be applied to countries where we provide no aid (France, Burma, Lebanon, Bulgaria).
5. Could not be applied easily within international financing institutions ... unless we invoke extreme action of
veto.
6. A11 threats subject to our bluff being called
When Gross read the "international working group report," as it was called, he knew he was playing with fire
in threatening to cut off American aid, but he also believed that " our bluff wouldn't be called. He thus began
the main counterinsurgency effort against heroin by inducing Laos and Thailand, which were militarily
dependent on the United States, to form mobile strike forces with American advisors. These strike forces could
then be employed against narcotics traffickers in the Golden Triangle. In Laos, "irregular" narcotics police, as [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl fopke.keep.pl
breaking of the New York Times [Pentagon Papers] story." This promising project, however, was jettisoned
when Tex McCrary, who was to be the fund-raiser for the foundation, inadvertently told a journalist about the
plan to raise money from the drug to wage the heroin crusade. As Donfeld pointed out in a February 4, 1972,
memorandum, "Once it becomes known that we are courting the pharmaceutical industry, the integrity of the
project is impugned," and he recommended that "someone turn off McCrary." Even though by this time Gen.
William Westmoreland and Tricia Nixon had been mobilized for the March of Dollars, Haldeman decided
reluctantly to "turn off" the foundation idea.
As it turned out, narcotics did not prove to be as great a lure for attracting celebrities and finances as the Nixon
strategists had hoped.
As the 1972 election approached, and corporations contributed, illicitly, tens of millions of dollars to the
Nixon reelection campaign, and celebrities joined the political bandwagon, the "celebrity file" was closed.
http://www.mega.nu:8080/ampp/epstein/aof18.html (3 of 3) [9/16/2000 16:16:27]
World War III
Agency of Fear
Opiates and Political Power in America
By Edward Jay Epstein
Chapter 19 - World War III
On August 2, 1971, Nelson Gross, of Saddle River, New Jersey, was chosen to lead a worldwide attack on
illicit drugs. As A New Jersey politician, Gross had been successful in staging a quiet revolt against the older
wing of the Republican party in New Jersey, thus gaining a modicum of power for himself in 1968. He failed
to win elected office as a congressman or senator, even though he ran loyally on President Nixon's
law-and-order theme. After his defeat for the Senate in 1970, Gross asked Nixon for a position in foreign
policy, and Nixon appointed him senior advisor and coordinator for international narcotics matters at the
Department of State. In theory, the "global war against drugs was to be coordinated by the newly created
(September, 1971) Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, which held its first meeting on
network television and included such illustrious figures as Secretary of State William Rogers, who nominally
chaired the new committee, Attorney General John Mitchell, Secretary of the Treasury John Connally,
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, newly appointed Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, and CIA director
Richard Helms. The committee met on only three other occasions before it was phased out after the 1972
election, and most of the day-to-day tactical decisions were left to Gross and Egil Krogh, who was, in addition
to his other duties, executive director of the cabinet committee.
Although a battle had temporarily been won in Turkey, the war against heroin was anything but over-at least
as far as Gross and Krogh were concerned. The 1972 election was little more than a year away, and there was
the dramatic possibility for further victories in the war against heroin. The rapidly expanding BNDD (its
budget had trebled in four years) advanced the theory that there still remained a large Turkish stockpile of
opium, which would explain the need for drug agents in the foreseeable future. According to the convenient
stockpile theory, every Turkish poppy farmer had squirreled away a hoard of opium as a dowry for his
daughter's marriage and for other future emergencies. Even though they were now being forced by their
government to plow under their opium crops, they could reach into this presumed hoard and sell it to
traffickers for the American market.
President Nixon had already publicly demanded the eradication of the poppy flower from the entire world, and
Gross concluded that America could not wait for the screw worm to be developed. The Golden Triangle was
not only producing ten times as much illicit opium as Turkey ever produced but supplying about 20 percent of
the American soldiers in Vietnam with pure heroin. Gross foresaw that it was only a matter of time before this
Golden Triangle heroin found its way into the American market, and he decided to consult Graham Martin,
who had been ambassador to Thailand and to Italy before becoming ambassador to South Vietnam. Much to
Gross's surprise, but not necessarily to the White House staffs, Ambassador Martin, in a state of exasperation,
reported in no uncertain terms that the only way of disrupting the supply of opium from the Golden Triangle
was to organize assassination teams to kill the few key traffickers that controlled the trade. Though New Jersey
politics in Gross's day were fairly tough, assassinations seemed extreme.
http://www.mega.nu:8080/ampp/epstein/aof19.html (1 of 3) [9/16/2000 16:16:51]
World War III
Instead, Gross decided to -make heroin a primary foreign-policy objective of the United States. He ordered
fifty-odd American embassies around the world to draw tip fiction plans which specified how American
diplomats in those countries could stimulate interest in the heroin problem to persuade the host government to
conform to American narcotics objectives, and to detail ways in which the CIA and State Department
intelligence could be used to discover and intercept heroin traffic. Gross further wanted American diplomats to
threaten any country that refused to cooperate in the effort with an immediate cutoff of economic and military
aid. He even suggested the use of the American veto to prevent the World Bank and other international
financial organizations from extending credit to such countries. There was considerable concern in the higher
councils of the State Department that such "heroin diplomacy," as Gross called it, would lose more friends for
the United States than it would net traffickers, and might endanger what they considered more long-term
foreign-policy objectives, such as the safety of the United States. Henry Kissinger's National Security Council
also had its doubts about heroin diplomacy, especially since less than two months before Gross assumed his
command in the new global war, the secret report of a White House task force with representatives from both
the National Security Council and the State Department concluded, "application of aid sanctions would be
ineffective and counterproductive except where degrees of U.S. support establish overwhelming diplomatic
dependence (Vietnam)." The White House task force recognized that aid sanctions might result in favorable
publicity for the president, but listed against this advantage six drawbacks.
1. would exasperate relations and make cooperation even less likely.
2. may create internal political repercussions making it difficult for governments to cooperate (Turkey,
Pakistan, India).
3. Would be counterproductive to other major U.S. security and foreign policy needs (Southeast Asia, Turkey).
4. Cannot be applied to countries where we provide no aid (France, Burma, Lebanon, Bulgaria).
5. Could not be applied easily within international financing institutions ... unless we invoke extreme action of
veto.
6. A11 threats subject to our bluff being called
When Gross read the "international working group report," as it was called, he knew he was playing with fire
in threatening to cut off American aid, but he also believed that " our bluff wouldn't be called. He thus began
the main counterinsurgency effort against heroin by inducing Laos and Thailand, which were militarily
dependent on the United States, to form mobile strike forces with American advisors. These strike forces could
then be employed against narcotics traffickers in the Golden Triangle. In Laos, "irregular" narcotics police, as [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]